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MODES OF KNOWING: AUTISM, FICTION,  
AND SECOND-PERSON PERSPECTIVES
Eleonore Stump
The rapid, perplexing increase in the incidence of autism has led to a correla-
tive increase in research on it and on normally developing children as well. 
In this paper I consider some of this research, not only for what it shows us 
about human cognitive capacities but also for its suggestive implications re-
garding the ability of science to teach us about the world.
1. Autism and the Knowledge of Persons
One pair of researchers sums up autism by saying that “the chief diagnos-
tic signs of autism are social isolation, lack of eye contact, poor language 
capacity and absence of empathy.”1 Whatever ties together the different 
clinical signs of all the degrees of autism, the most salient feature of the 
disorder is its severe impairment in what psychologists call ‘social cogni-
tion,’ or what philosophers call ‘mindreading.’ This is the knowledge of 
persons and their mental states.
Autism’s deficits as regards social cognition or mind-reading have 
made researchers increasingly aware of what normally developing chil-
dren can do effortlessly. So, for example, numerous studies2 show that a 
pre-linguistic infant can know her primary care-giver as a person and can 
even, as it were, read the mind of her care-giver to some limited extent.3 
In fact, it has become clear that a pre-linguistic infant’s capacity for social 
cognition is foundational to the infant’s ability to learn a language or to 
develop normal cognitive abilities in many other areas. The difficulty in 
learning language evinced by autistic children seems to be a function of 
the fact that they are severely impaired in their ability to know persons 
and to engage in “mindreading” of them.
The knowledge missing for an autistic child, however, cannot be taken 
as knowledge that something or other is the case. A pre-linguistic infant 
1Vilayanur S. Ramachandran and Lindsay M. Oberman, “Broken Mirrors: A Theory of 
Autism,” Scientific American, November 2006, p. 64.
2See, for example, the collection of papers in Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa Mc-
Cormack, and Johannes Roessler, Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2005).
3For a philosophical attempt to explain the nature of mindreading, see Shaun Nichols and 
Stephen Stich, Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understand-
ing Other Minds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003).
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is not capable of knowledge that a particular person is her mother; but 
she can know her mother, and to one extent or another she can also know 
some of her mother’s mental states. Conversely, an autistic child can know 
that a particular macroscopic object is a human person or that the person 
in question has a certain mental state. But the autistic child can know such 
things without the knowledge that comes with mindreading. For example, 
an autistic child might know that the person whose face he is seeing is sad, 
but in virtue of the impairment of autism he is unlikely to have this knowl-
edge that because he knows the sadness of the other person. An autistic 
child can know that someone he is looking at is sad because, for example, 
someone who is a reliable authority for the child has told him so. This is 
clearly not the same as the child’s knowing the sadness in the face of the 
person he is looking at.4 What is impaired in the cognition of an autistic 
child is a direct knowledge of persons and their mental states.
What sort of impairment is this? One researcher on autism, Peter Hob-
son, quotes Wittgenstein to help him explain the kind of knowledge which 
normally developing infants do have and with regard to which autistic 
children are impaired. He says,
“We see emotion”—As opposed to what?—We do not see facial contortions 
and make the inference that he is feeling joy, grief, boredom.5
For Hobson, we know the mental states of others not as knowledge that but 
more nearly by direct awareness, in the manner of perception, as it were.
So normally functioning human beings have the capacity for a knowl-
edge of persons and their mental states which is fundamentally differ-
ent from knowledge that. Insofar as autistic children are deficient in their 
knowledge that something is the case as regards the mental states of other 
people, it is because they are impaired in their capacity for a kind of knowl-
edge which is not reducible, or not entirely reducible, to knowledge that.
But what is this cognitive capacity? How are we to understand it and 
the kind of knowledge it makes possible?
2. Mirror Neurons
There is as yet no uncontested explanation of autism; but at present two 
lines of research seem particularly promising in their ability to illuminate 
it. The first, pursued by developmental psychologists and discussed also 
by philosophers, highlights a deficiency among autistic children in their 
capacity for engaging in what researchers call ‘dyadic attention sharing.’ 
In the interest of brevity, I am going to leave this work to one side. Here I 
want to call attention only to the second line of research, that having to do 
with mirror neurons.
4See Derek Moore, Peter Hobson, and Anthony Lee, “Components of Person Perception: 
An Investigation With Autistic, Non-autistic Retarded and Typically Developing Children 
and Adolescents,” British Journal of Developmental Psychology 15 (1997), pp. 401–423.
5Peter Hobson, The Cradle of Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 243.
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In the 1990s, a team of Italian neuroscientists discovered that certain 
neurons—which they called ‘mirror neurons’—fire both when one does 
some action oneself and also when one sees that same action being per-
formed by someone else. It now seems as if the mirror neuron system is 
foundational for the capacity of all normal human beings at any age to 
know the mind of another person.6 When John sees Mary smile at him 
and pick a flower in a certain way, he knows that she is going to give the 
flower to him. How does he know what she is doing? How does he know 
what she is feeling and intending to do? The Italian team of researchers 
responsible for the discovery of mirror neurons says,
A decade ago most neuroscientists and psychologists [and, they might have 
added, philosophers] would have attributed an individual’s understanding 
of someone else’s actions and, especially, intentions to a rapid reasoning pro-
cess not unlike that used to solve a logical problem: some sophisticated ap-
paratus in John’s brain elaborated on the information his senses took in and 
compared it with similar previously stored experiences, allowing John to 
arrive at a conclusion about what Mary was up to and why.7
The discovery of the mirror neuron system has made this sort of at-
tempt at understanding the human ability to mindread look Ptolemaic. 
Trying to summarize their research, the Italian researchers go on to say,
John grasps Mary’s action because even as it is happening before his eyes, 
it is also happening, in effect, inside his head . . . mirror neurons permit an 
observed act to be directly understood by experiencing it.8
This summary of theirs is not entirely perspicuous, from a philosophi-
cal point of view since it is not clear what it is to experience an observed 
act. Nonetheless, the research of these neurobiologists, as well as that of 
many others, has shown convincingly that mirror neurons underlie the 
human capacity to know not only someone else’s actions, but also her 
intentions and emotions. Describing their research on the role of mirror 
neurons in mediating the knowledge of intentions, another team of re-
searchers says,
the ability to understand the intentions associated with the actions of others 
is a fundamental component of social behavior, and its deficit is typically 
associated with socially isolating mental diseases such as autism . . . . Ex-
periments in monkeys [have] demonstrated that frontal and parietal mirror 
neurons code the “what” of the observed action. . . . The findings [of this 
study] . . . strongly suggest that this mirror neuron area actively participates 
in understanding the intentions behind the observed actions. . . . The present 
6The mirror neuron system is predicated on recognition of a person as a person, but by 
itself it does not seem to facilitate that recognition, as we currently understand the workings 
of the mirror neuron system. So the knowledge of persons cannot be explained by the mirror 
neuron system alone, as far as we now know.
7Giacomo Rizzolatti, Leonardo Fogassi, and Vittorio Gallese, “Mirrors in the Mind,” Sci-
entific American, November 2006, p. 54.
8Ibid., pp. 56 and 58.
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data show that the intentions behind the actions of others can be recognized 
by the motor system using a mirror mechanism.9
Other researchers who are working on mirror neurons and emotions put 
the point this way:
Observing another person experiencing emotion can trigger a cognitive 
elaboration of that sensory information, which ultimately results in a logical 
conclusion about what the other is feeling. It may also, however, result in the 
direct mapping of that sensory information onto the motor structures that 
would produce the experience of that emotion in the observer. These two 
means of recognizing emotions are profoundly different: with the first, the 
observer deduces the emotion but does not feel it; via the second, recogni-
tion is firsthand because the mirror mechanism elicits the same emotional 
state in the observer.10
It is not entirely clear what these researchers mean by saying that the 
mirror mechanism elicits the same emotional state in the observer. It is 
certainly not the case that every time a person observes the emotion of 
another, he comes to have that same emotion himself. But perhaps these 
researchers mean only that one can feel something of the emotion of an-
other as that other’s emotion.
What all these researchers are struggling to describe is the knowledge 
of another person and of that other’s mental states when that knowledge 
shares features with the phenomenology of certain kinds of perception. 
Like the perception of color, for example, the knowledge of persons at is-
sue here is direct, intuitive, and hard to translate without remainder into 
knowledge that, but very useful as a basis for knowledge that of one sort 
or another. John knows that Mary is going to give him a flower because 
he first knows Mary, her action, her emotion, and her intention—but these 
are things which he knows by, as it were, seeing them, and not by cogniz-
ing them in the knowledge that way.11
9Marco Kacoboni, Istvan Molnar-Szakacs, Vittorio Gallese, Giovanni Bucciono, John C. 
Mazziotta, and Giacomo Rizzolatti, “Grasping the Intentions of Others with One’s Own Mir-
ror Neuron System,” PloS Biology 3 (2005), pp. 1, 4, 5. 
10Rizzolatti et al., “Mirrors in the Mind,” p. 60.
11These results from psychology and neuroscience should prompt us to reflect more 
broadly about knowledge which is not knowledge that. Like the things proposed as objects 
of knowledge by acquaintance, the objects of Franciscan knowledge can be even inanimate 
things. So, for example, an infant knows a ball as a ball before the infant is in a position to 
know that this is a ball. As far as that goes, even for normally functioning adult human be-
ings, there is a difference between knowing something as a thing of a kind and knowing that 
this is a thing of that kind. A person who has a visual agnosia might not be able to know a 
glove as a glove, but he might still be able to know that this is a glove, say, because his physi-
cian has told him so. (See Oliver Sacks, The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat [New York: 
Summit Books, 1985]. For a helpful recent neurobiological study of agnosia, see Martha J. 
Farah, Visual Agnosia [Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990].) In fact, it seems as if knowledge 
which is not knowledge that must be primary. Without any knowledge of a thing as a thing, 
it is hard to see how anyone could have knowledge that this something-or-other has certain 
properties or stands in certain relations to something else. Aquinas makes this point by say-
ing that the primary act of the intellect is the knowledge of the quiddity of a thing, that is, the 
knowledge of a thing as a thing; on his view, this sort of cognition is prior to the intellect’s 
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And so these discoveries about the mirror neuron system help to ex-
plain the Wittgensteinian point Hobson made in the quotation I cited ear-
lier. We see emotion, as we see intention, because the mirror neuron system 
gives us a sort of direct apprehension of someone else’s mental state.
3. Second-person Experience
One group of neurobiologists try to explain the knowledge mediated by 
the mirror neuron system by relying on a common philosophical distinc-
tion. They say,
Humans are an exquisitely social species. Our survival and success depends 
crucially on our ability to thrive in complex social situations.12
The novelty of our approach consists in providing for the first time a neu-
rophysiological account of the experiential dimension of both action and 
emotion understanding. What makes social interactions so different from 
our perception of the inanimate world is that we witness the actions and 
emotions of others, but we also carry out similar actions and we experience 
similar emotions. There is something shared between our first- and third-
person experience of these phenomena: the observer and the observed are 
both individuals endowed with a similar brain-body system. A crucial ele-
ment of social cognition is the brain’s capacity to directly link the first- and 
third-person experiences of these phenomena.13
These neurobiologists are here availing themselves of the distinction by 
now familiar in contemporary philosophy between a first-person and a 
third-person experience or point of view. But, contrary to their view, it does 
not seem right to take the knowledge of persons which the mirror neuron 
system subserves as a first-person knowledge of oneself, or a third-person 
knowledge of another, or some combination of both together. Rather, it 
seems to be something entirely different. Under one or another descrip-
tion, some philosophers are now drawing our attention to the importance 
of what can be called ‘a second-person point of view’ or ‘a second-person 
experience.’14 In my view, this is more nearly the notion which the neuro-
biologists need to express what is of interest to them.15
having knowledge expressible in propositional form. (See the chapter on the mechanisms of 
cognition in my Aquinas [London: Routledge, 2003].) This broader claim about Franciscan 
knowledge is, of course, even more contentious than the claims about the knowledge of per-
sons, and it cannot be adequately expounded or supported in passing here.
12Gallese et al. 2004, p. 396.
13Ibid.
14See, for example, Stephen Darwall, “Fichte and the Second-Person Standpoint,” Interna-
tionales Jahrbuch des deutschen Idealismus 3 (2005), pp. 91–113; and The Second-person Standpoint: 
Morality, Respect, and Accountability (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
15In this chapter, I distinguish not only among first-person, second-person, and third-per-
son experiences, but also among the corresponding points of view and accounts. I have no 
neat and precise definitions for any of these, but, put roughly, what I have in mind is this. A 
first-person experience is an experience I have with some degree or other of conscious aware-
ness and which I could have by myself. A first-person point of view is my reflection on or 
observation of my (real or imagined) first-person experience considered as a first-person ex-
perience (as distinct, for example, from considering that experience as a neurologist or some 
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For my purposes, I will understand a second-person experience in this 
way. One person Monica has a second-person experience of another per-
son Nathan only if
(1) Monica is aware of Nathan as a person (call the relation Monica has 
to Nathan in this condition ‘personal interaction’),
(2) Monica’s personal interaction with Nathan is of a direct and imme-
diate sort,
and
(3)  Nathan is conscious.16
These conditions are necessary for second-person experience and suffi-
cient for a minimal degree of it.
Condition (1) implies that Monica does not have a second-person expe-
rience of Nathan if Monica is dumped unconscious on top of Nathan; even 
if Nathan is conscious, it is necessary that Monica be conscious as well if 
Monica is to have a second-person experience of Nathan. Furthermore, if 
Monica is conscious but not aware of Nathan—say, because Nathan is hid-
ing and Monica does not know he is present—then Monica does not have 
a second-person experience of Nathan. Condition (1) can be met, however, 
even if Monica does not have perception of Nathan. It is possible for one 
person to be aware of another as a person without seeing, hearing, smell-
ing, touching, or tasting that other person. For example, if Monica and 
Nathan are engaged in an animated conversation with one another which 
they conduct by means of email, Monica is aware of Nathan as a person, 
even if she does not perceive Nathan.17
other third person might consider it). And a first-person account is my account to someone 
else of my reflection on or observation of my (real or imagined) first-person experience qua 
first-person experience. So, my wanting a cup of coffee when I am in a normal cognitive and 
conative condition is a first-person experience; I want the coffee, and the desire is a conscious 
desire in me. My conscious, introspective reflection on or observation of that conscious de-
sire is a first-person point of view. I can have a conscious state without a conscious reflection 
on it or observation of it, as I do when I drive to work, conscious of the state of the road but 
focused intently on the news on the radio, so that I don’t attend to the conscious visual states 
which guide my driving. And my explaining my desire considered as a first-person expe-
rience to someone else is a first-person account. Something roughly similar distinguishes 
experience, point of view, and account for the second- and third-person analogues.
16Insofar as consciousness comes in degrees, there is some vagueness in this condition. I 
mean to rule out only cases in which a person lacks sufficient consciousness to function as 
a person. Drowsiness is not ruled out; certain drugged states, such as the so-called twilight 
sleep, are. There are also grey areas here. I am inclined to say that a mother has second-per-
son experience of her newborn infant, but that a condition such as advanced Alzheimer’s pre-
cludes second-person experience. But my intuitions are not strong as regards those cases. (I 
am grateful to Kathleen Brennan for calling my attention to the need to address this issue.)
17The scientific descriptions of the mirror neuron system quoted above make it plain that 
the primary perceptual modality used in conjunction with the mirror neuron system is vision. 
Nonetheless, it must also be the case that the mirror neuron system can be engaged in con-
junction with other perceptual modalities as well. If that were not the case, then congenitally 
blind children would be autistic. Although there is in fact a significant incidence of autism-
like disorder among the congenitally blind, there are also many congenitally blind children 
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As for condition (2), I take Monica’s personal interaction with Nathan 
to be mediated and indirect just in case Monica has personal interaction 
with Nathan only in virtue of having personal interaction with a third per-
son Aaron. So condition (2) rules out cases of personal interaction which 
are mediated by one or more other people, but it does not rule out in-
termediaries which are machines or mechanical devices, such as glasses, 
telephones, and computers. If Monica’s only contact with Nathan is by 
computer, but if the computer contact between them meets the other con-
ditions for second-person experience, then Monica’s computer contact 
with Nathan counts as a second-person experience.18 On the other hand, 
Monica does not count as having a second-person experience of Nathan if 
her contact consists just in Aaron’s reporting to Monica something Nathan 
has said or done. In such a case, Nathan is conscious, and Monica is aware 
of Nathan as a person, in some sense; but this sort of awareness of Nathan 
is insufficient to count as a second-person experience of Nathan because it 
is mediated by a third person.
Finally, condition (3) requires that Nathan be conscious for Monica to 
have a second-person experience of him. It is not necessary, however, that 
Nathan be conscious of Monica. Polonius has a second-person experience 
of Hamlet when Polonius is hidden from Hamlet behind a screen, watch-
ing Hamlet interact with his mother.19
So this is how I will understand a second-person experience. This charac-
terization of a second-person experience makes clear that a second-person 
who are not autistic. (See, for example, Rachel Brown, Peter Hobson, and Anthony Lee, “Are 
there ‘Autistic-like’ Features in Congenitally Blind Children?,” Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry 38 [1997].) Insofar as defects in the mirror neuron system are now thought to im-
plicated in autism, it must be the case that the mirror neuron system can be employed even in 
the absence of vision. Insofar as written language can stand in for spoken language process-
ing by hearing for those who can read, it is possible that a second-person experience based 
on written communication also be facilitated by the mirror neuron system.
18Although Monica does not have sensory perception of Nathan in the process of email-
ing him (she does not see,hear, touch, taste, or smell Nathan in email communication), that 
fact does not rule out email contact from counting as second-person experience, provided 
only that it really is Nathan with whom Monica is in email contact. If someone other than 
Nathan is emailing Monica in the persona of Nathan, then the email communication doesn’t 
count as Monica’s having a second-person experience of Nathan. There are grey areas here, 
too. If it really is Nathan who is emailing Monica but Nathan is systematically deceiving 
Monica on all points about himself, it is considerably less clear whether the email commu-
nication counts as a second-person experience of Nathan for Monica. I am grateful to John 
Kavanaugh for pointing out these complexities to me.
19I am indebted to John Kavanaugh and Adam Peterson for helping me to see that there 
are complexities here, too. If Nathan sends Monica email communication but then dies in the 
period between when he sent it and when Monica reads it, so that he is no longer conscious 
at the time Monica reads his message, does that communication count as Monica’s having 
second-person experience of Nathan? And if it does, is the third of my conditions on second-
person experience violated in such a case? I am inclined to say that Monica does have second-
person experience in such a case but that the third condition is not violated. It is possible for 
the presentation of a conscious person Nathan to reach another person Monica after some 
delay, as the email example makes clear. Nonetheless, the Nathan with whom Monica is in 
contact by this means is a conscious Nathan, not the Nathan who is unconscious at the time 
of Monica’s receipt of Nathan’s message. And in this way the third condition is not violated 
by this example.
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experience is different from a first-person experience. In a first-person ex-
perience, I am directly and immediately aware of a person as a person, but 
that person is only myself. It is also clear that a second-person experience 
is different from a third-person experience. For a third-person experience, 
one has knowledge of the states of another person but not in virtue of being 
conscious of that other person as a person. So a second-person experience 
is different in character from a first-person or a third-person experience 
because it is necessary for a second-person experience, as it is not for a 
first- or third-person experience, that you interact consciously and directly 
with another person who is conscious and present to you as a person, in 
one way or another.20
We are hardly in a position to give a clear and complete account of 
knowledge which is not knowledge that or even just of the knowledge of 
persons directly subserved by the mirror neuron system. But however we 
are to describe the knowledge of persons enabled by the mirror neuron 
system, in my view, it cannot be captured appropriately as knowledge 
of either a first-person or a third-person kind. It is more nearly accurate 
to describe it in terms of a second-person experience. Although the mir-
ror neuron system no doubt also facilitates knowledge in ways which are 
variants of a second-person experience,21 the paradigmatic sort of experi-
ence in which one gains the kind of knowledge of persons subserved by 
the mirror neuron system is a second-person experience. The mirror neu-
ron system seems to be a neural system designed to enable second-person 
experience and the knowledge of persons it generates.
4. Second-person Accounts
With so much clarification of the notion of a second-person experience, I 
want to consider the means by which the knowledge of persons gained in 
a second-person experience can be communicated to someone who was 
not part of the second-person experience in question. It will be helpful to 
have some short designation for a shareable account of a second-person 
experience. So call such an account ‘a second person account,’ by analogy 
with the more customary notions of first-person or third-person accounts 
20In a subsequent chapter, I will explain that a second-person experience is a matter of one 
person’s being in a position to share attention with another person; it is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for joint attention. 
21Annette Baier has suggested to me that one can mindread the mind of a person who is 
sleeping, to some limited extent, but the experience one has of a sleeping person is not a sec-
ond-person experience, as I have described second-person experience. It may also be the case 
that the mirror neuron system enables us to have a quasi-personal experience of things which 
are not persons, as when one has a sense of the personality of a robot, for example, or even 
when one has a sense of the personality of a building. But such experiences would not count 
as second-person experiences on my account. So there may be a broad genus of experiences 
of persons and quasi-personal things which is facilitated by the mirror neuron system and 
which enables a person in such experience to mindread, and second-person experience may 
be only one species within this genus. If so, second-person experience nonetheless seems to 
be the exemplar on the basis of which the other species within the genus can be understood. I 
am indebted to Alan Musgrave for calling my attention to the need to make this point. 
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or reports.22 A second-person account is not itself a second-person experi-
ence, but it is a report of a second-person experience communicated to 
someone else.
But why think that there is such a thing as a second-person account? 
What would differentiate it from either a first-person or third-person 
account? In a first-person account, I give a report about some first-per-
son experience of mine. In a third-person account, someone gives a re-
port about some feature or condition of someone else. What is there left 
for a second-person account to do? Why wouldn’t a report of a second-
person experience simply be one more first-person account—if I report 
the conscious states which I had in the second-person experience23—
or one more third-person account—if I report something about some 
other person which I observed during my second-person experience 
of her? Why couldn’t a second-person experience be represented ad-
equately in ordinary expository prose24 of either the first-person or the 
third-person variety?
If everything knowable in a second-person experience could be ex-
pressed in terms of knowing that, either with regard to oneself or the oth-
ers with whom one interacts, then no doubt a second-person experience 
could be captured by first-person and third-person accounts, and there 
would be no room for anything that could be considered a second-person 
account. But the cumulative weight of the evidence I have given about the 
knowledge of persons is sufficient to show its distinctive character. Sec-
ond-person experiences cannot be reduced to first-person or third-person 
experiences without remainder, and so they cannot be captured by first-
person or third-person accounts either.
22It is no part of my distinctions among first-person, second-person, and third-person 
experiences, points of view, and accounts to suggest that there is opposition among these so 
that an agent who adopts one of these about something is thereby precluded from adopt-
ing any of the others. So, for example, someone who has first-person experiences of beliefs 
and desires might also consider even his own beliefs and desires from a third-person point 
of view, as a neurologist would. It is also possible to combine first-person, second-person, 
and third-person perspectives in an iterative fashion. For example, I might tell you about 
my introspective experiences of listening to music; then you would have a second-person 
experience of me which included my first-person account. Or I might introspect reflectively 
on my second-person experience of you, considering how I really felt about what you said. 
Then I would have a first-person point of view about a second-person experience. Religious 
believers can consider religion from a first-person point of view, where that point of view 
includes reflection on what they take to be their own second-person experiences connecting 
them in some fashion with the person of God. I am indebted to Al Plantinga for prompting 
me to consider this issue.
23I am not here violating the explanation of first-person accounts given above, because, 
insofar as what is at issue is my conscious states, these are states I could have had during a 
hallucination of another person, when no other person was present. So the experience being 
reported in this first-person account is one I could have had by myself.
24For purposes of this chapter, I take ‘expository prose’ to mean prose which does not 
constitute a story and which does not fall into some other genre of literature (such as poetry) 
that is story-like in its artistry. I will describe accounts that are formulated in terms of know-
ing that something or other is the case as presented in expository prose. I am therefore using 
‘expository prose’ as a term of art, faute de mieux. 
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To some people, this conclusion might seem equivalent to the claim 
that a second-person account is impossible. If the knowledge of persons 
is difficult or impossible to express in terms of knowing that, how can any 
account of it be given at all? If the knowledge of persons is subserved by 
the mirror neuron system, then it seems as if this knowledge could not be 
shared by anyone who was not involved in the second-person experience 
in question.
In one sense, this conclusion is right. There is no way to give an ad-
equate account in expository prose of a second-person experience. But it 
does not follow that no account of it is possible at all. While we cannot 
express the distinctive knowledge of such an experience as a matter of 
knowing that, we can do something to re-present the experience itself in 
such a way that we can share it with others who were not part of it, so that 
the knowledge of persons garnered from the experience is also available 
to them.25
This is generally what we do when we tell a story.26 A story takes a real 
or imagined set of second-person experiences and makes it available to a 
wider audience to share.27 It does so by making it possible, to one degree or 
another,28 for a person to experience what it would have been like for her if 
she had been an on-looker in the second-person experiences represented 
in the story.29 That is, a story gives a person some of what she would have 
25In this respect, a second-person experience differs from a first-person experience of the 
sort we have in perception. There is no way for me to convey to someone who has never seen 
colors what I know when I know what it is like to see red.
26I am not here implying that the only function, or even the main function, of narratives 
(in one medium or another) is to convey real or imagined second-person experiences. My 
claim is just that much less is lost of a second-person experience in a narrative account than 
in a third-person account, ceteris paribus.
27Someone might object here that any information which could be captured and conveyed 
by a story could also be conveyed by an expository account. I have no good argument against 
this claim, for the very reasons I have been urging, namely, that we can’t give an expository 
description of what else is contained in a story; but I think the claim is false. Consider, for ex-
ample, some excellent and current biography of Samuel Johnson, such as Robert DeMaria’s 
The Life of Samuel Johnson: A Critical Biography (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), and compare it to 
the pastiche of stories in Boswell’s Life of Johnson, and you see the point. There is a great deal 
to be learned about Johnson from DeMaria’s The Life of Samuel Johnson, but Boswell’s stories 
give you the man as the biography can’t. 
28The degree will be a function not only of the narrative excellence of the story but also of 
the sensitivity and intelligence of the story-hearer or reader as well.
29For an initial presentation of this idea, see my “Second Person Accounts and the Problem 
of Evil” in Perspectives in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, Schriften der Luther-Agricola-
Gesellschaft 46, ed. Timo Koistinen and Tommi Lehtonen (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society, 
2000), pp. 88–113; reprinted (among other places) in Faith and Narrative, ed. Keith Yandell 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 86–103. (The idea was originally presented in 
my Stob lectures, which appeared together with subsequent Stob lectures in Seeking Under-
standing: The Stob Lectures 1986–1998 [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001], pp. 497–529.) Cf. 
also, Kenneth Walton, “Spelunking, Simulation, and Slime: On Being Moved by Fiction,” in 
Emotion and the Arts, ed. Mette Jhorte and Sue Laver (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997). For a helpful discussion of the positions of Walton and others in connection with simu-
lation, see Alvin Goldman, “Imagination and Simulation in Audience Responses to Fiction,” 
in The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction, ed. Shaun 
Nichols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), pp. 41–56. 
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had if she had had unmediated personal interaction with the characters 
in the story while they were conscious and interacting with each other, 
without actually making her part of the story itself. The re-presenting of 
a second-person experience in a story thus constitutes a second-person 
account. It is a report of a second-person experience which doesn’t lose 
(at least doesn’t lose entirely) the distinctively second-person character of 
the experience.
We can put the point I am trying to make the other way around by 
noticing what we lose if we try to reduce a narrative to expository (that 
is, non-narrative) prose. If we boil a story down to non-narrative proposi-
tions, so that all the knowledge it conveys is knowledge that,30 then we 
lose the knowledge that the story distinctively provides just because we 
cannot convey by means of expository prose alone even a simulacrum of 
a second-person experience.31 A real story cannot be captured in a set of 
non-narrative propositions designed to summarize it; a prose summary is 
no substitute for the literary work itself.
Why should this be so? Why should it be the case that knowledge which 
is subserved by the mirror neuron system in second-person experience 
should also be available to one extent or another through stories?
Here it is helpful to think about the neural systems for perception. For 
example, recent studies of vision have investigated what happens when 
a person sees a complex object and then watches that object rotating in 
space. Studies on visual imagery have made it clear that those parts of the 
visual system which are involved in the sight of the rotation of objects are 
also the parts of the system which are used when a person imagines the 
rotation of the imagined objects.32 It is now clear that the visual system can 
be used for the actual visual cognition and inspection of objects in physi-
cal reality, or the same neural system can be used to form images of objects 
and to rotate those imagined objects in the mind.
Nothing keeps us from supposing that the mirror neuron system 
which subserves the knowledge of persons can also be used in this dual 
purpose way, for the appropriation of second-person experience either 
in actuality or in thought only. If this is right, then it might be that when 
we engage with fiction, we also employ the mirror neuron system, but in 
an alternate mode, just as the visual system is employed in an alternate 
30Someone might suppose that we could turn any story into expository propositional 
form just be prefixing to the story the words ‘It is true in this story that’ and then filling out 
the remainder of the sentence with a conjunction formed from all the sentences in the story. 
But this swollen sentence would not constitute an example of expository prose since it would 
contain a story within it. And, in any case, it would not be true that all the knowledge in 
the story was conveyed by means of propositions that. The story would be embedded in a 
proposition that, but the distinctively Franciscan knowledge of the story would be conveyed 
by the story itself.
31I can’t, of course, specify what that knowledge is, since to do so would be to translate it 
into terms of knowledge that.
32See, for example, Stephen Kosslyn, Image and Brain: The Resolution of the Imagery Debate 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994).
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mode when we imagine the rotation of an imagined object. If the mirror 
neuron system is like the perceptual system in this regard, then the same 
system which explains our knowledge of persons in second-person expe-
rience could also explain our appropriation of the knowledge of persons 
through fiction.
I am not claiming here that the mirror neuron system is used in the 
appropriation of fiction to give us actual second-person experience. The 
appropriation of fiction doesn’t give us real second-person experience, 
any more than the imagined rotation of imagined objects gives us real vi-
sual inspection of such objects. I mean only that when fiction functions as 
a second-person account and we gain some knowledge of persons from 
fiction, one possible explanation for why we do so is that the mirror neu-
ron system can also be used in an alternate mode, for the engagement 
with fiction.
5. Conclusion
So there is a broad array of knowledge commonly had by human beings 
which cannot be formulated adequately or at all as knowledge that. One 
important species of such knowledge is the knowledge of persons. In 
normally functioning human beings, such knowledge has a source in the 
mirror neuron system, which enables a person to know the actions, inten-
tions, and emotions of another person in a direct, intuitive way analogous 
in some respects to perception. Such knowledge of persons is first gained 
through second-person experiences. And although the knowledge gained 
through second-person experiences is not reducible to knowledge that, it 
can be made available to others who lack the second-person experiences 
in question by means of a story of one sort or another that re-presents the 
experience. A story is, then, a second-person account.
Second-person experience and stories thus play a role with regard to the 
knowledge of persons analogous to the role played by postulates and argu-
ments with regard to knowledge that. Experience and stories, on the one 
hand, and postulates and arguments, on the other, are devices for the acqui-
sition and transfer of knowledge, although the kind of knowledge acquired 
or transferred and the sort of acquisition or transfer involved differ.
These two types of knowledge, knowledge that and knowledge of per-
sons, are clearly not in opposition to each other; rather, as the studies on 
autism show, both are needed for adequate understanding of the reality 
in which we live.
And so it is important for us to realize and take seriously the possibil-
ity that however valuable and important the kind of knowledge given us 
by those academic disciplines which focus on knowledge that, including 
the sciences, that sort of knowledge does not exhaust all there is to know 
which is important to us. In fact, if the major monotheisms are right in 
supposing that the ultimate foundation of all reality is a God, something 
with a mind and a will, then the sciences, whose focus is only on knowl-
edge that, will not be able to teach us all there is to know even about the 
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foundations of the universe. If the major monotheisms are right, then even 
to understand what is ultimately real, we will need to have not just phys-
ics and cosmology but also the non-propositional knowledge of persons, 
which cannot be mediated to us by the sciences.33
St. Louis University
33This paper is also scheduled to appear in Science, Reason, and Truth, ed. Marco Bersanelli 
and Peter van Inwagen (forthcoming).
